I found a consistent vulnerability across all of them: Safety alignment relies almost entirely on the presence of the chat template.

When I stripped the <|im_start|> / instruction tokens and passed raw strings:

Gemma-3 refusal rates dropped from 100% → 60%.

Qwen3 refusal rates dropped from 80% → 40%.

SmolLM2 showed 0% refusal (pure obedience).

Qualitative failures were stark: models that previously refused to generate explosives tutorials or explicit fiction immediately complied when the "Assistant" persona wasn't triggered by the template.

It seems we are treating client-side string formatting as a load-bearing safety wall. Full logs, the apply_chat_template ablation code, and heatmaps are in the post.

Read the full analysis: https://teendifferent.substack.com/p/apply_chat_template-is-...