Sensitive data is locked in RAM (mlock/VirtualLock) to prevent swap exposure, and the zeroize crate clears secrets when done. Decryption verifies authentication before exposing plaintext and streams data to minimize memory exposure.

The parser strictly validates container format, uses constant-time comparisons, and rejects malformed inputs. Zip-bomb protection caps file counts at one million and path lengths at 4KB. Decryption uses staging directories with atomic rename on success, preventing partial extractions. Automatic cleanup runs on failure.

You can combine a password with an optional keyfile (up to 4 MiB). On Unix, the tool checks that keyfiles aren't world-readable. Keys are derived via HKDF with distinct domain strings, preventing reuse between encryption and nonce generation.

The design prioritizes security: no compression to avoid side-channels, symlink rejection, permission sanitization on extract, and a 20-character minimum password.